Investigating Flock Safety
- Atlanta, Georgia.
Six kids drive into a quiet neighborhood, jump out, and start pulling door handles on parked cars. No smashed windows. No tools. In a city like Atlanta, pull ten F-150 door handles and about three will be unlocked. One may have a gun inside.
That night, somebody’s gun was stolen.
The owner posted on Nextdoor: “Oh my gosh. I forgot my gun in my car, and it’s now gone.”
One neighbor who saw the post was an electrical engineer named Garrett Langley. He went to the police. The major he spoke with was, in Langley’s telling, “fairly apathetic.” Nobody had been physically hurt. There were no fingerprints and no useful evidence.
But the major told him what would change that.
A license plate.
So Langley built a plate reader by hand. An Android phone sealed inside a waterproof box, pointed at the entrance to his neighborhood. It photographed every car that entered. Within 30 days, it knew who lived there and who did not.
Two months later, another unlocked car. Another stolen gun. Langley gave police the plate of the one vehicle his system did not recognize. A lookout went out. Hours later, police found the vehicle, recovered the gun, and made an arrest.
Nine years later, that phone in a waterproof box had become a company valued at $7.5 billion. More than 100,000 cameras. Thousands of cities. One searchable network logging the movements of drivers across the United States.
And here is what one person could do with it.
In 2025, a sheriff’s deputy in Texas entered a search reason into Flock’s database: “had an abortion, search for female.” The query reached 83,345 cameras across 6,809 networks.
No warrant.
One deputy. One search. A national dragnet.
How did one stolen gun become one of the largest surveillance networks in American history?
From Victim to Watchman
Garrett Langley was not a police officer or defense contractor. He was an engineer whose previous startup, an airline seat-upgrade app, had been acquired by Cox Enterprises. Forbes noted that he had no experience in law-enforcement technology.
What he had was a prototype and a detective telling him it worked.
Langley called two former Georgia Tech classmates, Paige Todd and Matt Feury, and told them to quit their jobs. The three launched Flock Safety around a dining-room table in March 2017. They went through Y Combinator and sold a simple promise:
Evidence, not just footage.
Then came the decision that built the network. It was not a technical breakthrough. It was a sales strategy.
Police procurement is slow. Budgets. City councils. Requisitions. Public meetings. Flock went around that process by selling subscriptions to homeowners’ associations and neighborhood groups. Private citizens could approve a camera immediately, then share its footage with police voluntarily.
The state did not build the network.
Neighborhoods bought it and handed the state the keys.
Flock does not merely sell cameras. It leases them for roughly $2,000 to $3,000 per camera each year. By 2025, the company said it had passed $300 million in annual recurring revenue, growing about 70 percent in a year. Its investors include Andreessen Horowitz, Founders Fund, Kleiner Perkins, Tiger Global, and Y Combinator.
But nobody pays a $7.5 billion valuation for poles with lenses attached.
Every new neighborhood makes the system more valuable to every agency already using it. A camera records a plate. The network makes that plate searchable across jurisdictions. One HOA sees the entrance to one subdivision. Thousands of connected cameras see a person’s route.
The product is not the camera.
The product is the database.
Flock found another growth channel in local television. Langley has said the company’s first tens of millions in recurring revenue came “strictly off of five o’clock news.” When a camera helped solve a crime, Flock contacted the local station. Crime produced coverage. Coverage produced fear. Fear produced another subscription.
Fear was not a side effect.
Fear was the marketing department.
By 2025, Langley was no longer talking about one stolen gun. He told Forbes that Flock’s goal was to eliminate virtually all crime in America within a decade.
Not reduce it.
Eliminate it.
The founding story is compelling: a frustrated neighbor built a tool the police needed. A victim became a watchman. A camera solved a crime.
Then the camera became a network, and the watchman stopped being identifiable.
The Policies Say No. The Logs Say Yes.
Flock’s public position sounds reassuring. The company says customers own their data. Its website has stated that Flock will not share, sell, or access footage and that nobody at the company monitors it.
Whenever abuse comes up, the defense is familiar: Flock builds the tool. Customers decide how to use it.
Public records tell a different story.
MuckRock allows people to file Freedom of Information requests and publish the results. Search its archive for Flock Safety and you find contracts, emails, shared-network lists, and audit logs from departments across the country.
One records request produced a week of logs from Frisco, Texas.
Seven days. June 1 through June 7, 2026.
102,883 searches.
Most were not performed by Frisco police. Houston Police conducted 20,346 searches. Dallas Police conducted 17,598. The Texas Department of Public Safety conducted 11,607. Agencies with no jurisdiction in Frisco reached into the suburb’s camera network tens of thousands of times.
The same disclosure listed 590 organizations in the shared network. Police departments. Campus officers. Hospital districts. Home Depot. Lowe’s. Private corporations could operate their own cameras, flag vehicles, and generate alerts inside the same system used by law enforcement.
Flock does not need to share the data manually.
The network shares it by design.
The same architecture created three routes for federal access. A local agency can share directly. A local officer can conduct a search on behalf of a federal agency. Or a setting can expose a network beyond the jurisdiction that bought it.
Records reviewed by journalists and researchers found thousands of immigration-related searches. Agencies in Virginia conducted nearly 3,000 in twelve months. Denver logged more than 1,400 despite the city’s sanctuary policy. Atlanta denied cooperating with immigration enforcement while audit records showed searches performed on ICE’s behalf.
Then came Johnson County, Texas.
A woman’s partner reported that she had self-managed an abortion. A deputy entered her description and search reason into Flock. The query crossed state lines, including into states where abortion was legally protected, and returned sightings of her vehicle in Dallas.
Whatever your politics on abortion, the mechanism is the story. A state’s legal protection ended at its border.
The cameras did not.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation later obtained more than 12 million search logs from over 3,900 agencies. Among them were searches connected to political protests and animal-rights activists. First Amendment activity, converted into license-plate queries.
When officers wanted to obscure what they were doing, some entered “investigation” as the reason or reused case numbers unrelated to the search.
Cities often did not understand the reach of their own systems. Mountain View discovered that a broad lookup feature had been enabled on 29 of its 30 cameras without the city’s knowledge. Outside agencies searched its data hundreds of thousands of times. Syracuse’s network reportedly received 4.4 million searches in one year. Oxnard restricted access to California, only for a vendor-side issue to switch nationwide sharing back on.
Evanston canceled its contract. Flock allegedly reinstalled the cameras without permission.
How the fuck does that happen?
Even when nobody abuses the database, the database can be wrong. A Flock camera in Toledo reportedly confused a seven with a two. Police forced an innocent driver to the ground at gunpoint, a dog bit him, and he was jailed. Other false alerts have led officers to stop grandparents and families with children at gunpoint.
The database does not have to be right.
It only has to be believed.
The Algorithmic Panopticon
In 1787, English philosopher Jeremy Bentham designed a prison.
The cells formed a ring around a central watchtower. The prisoners were always visible. The tower’s windows prevented them from knowing whether a guard was looking back.
That uncertainty was the mechanism.
If an inmate could never verify when he was being watched, he had to behave as though he always was. Bentham called the design the Panopticon. He considered it a humane technology: discipline without chains, order without constant force.
In 1975, Michel Foucault recognized what the blueprint actually described.
Foucault was a French philosopher who spent his career studying the inner workings of power. In Discipline and Punish, he argued that the Panopticon was more than a prison. It was a diagram of modern society.
The genius of the tower is not the guard. It is the guard the prisoner builds inside himself.
Foucault wrote that power becomes “automatized and disindividualized.” Nobody has to occupy the tower continuously. Surveillance only needs to be possible, believable, and built into the environment. The prisoner does the remaining work.
This produces the standard objection: nobody is sitting behind a desk following your Honda to Trader Joe’s.
That objection is Foucault’s point.
The system does not require continuous observation. It requires uncertainty. You do not know whether an officer, federal agent, corporation, or HOA administrator will search your plate. You only know that they can.
Imagine driving to a protest. A clinic. An immigration lawyer’s office. The cameras exist on the route, but the search is invisible. Somewhere in the back of your mind appears a small question:
Maybe I should not go.
That hesitation is the panopticon working.
Bentham’s tower needed a guard who might be watching.
Flock’s tower has a search bar.
There is an honest limitation to the analogy. A panopticon nobody knows about cannot discipline anyone. Bentham’s inmates had to see the tower. Most Americans still do not know what a Flock camera looks like.
For them, the system is not yet a panopticon.
It is a dragnet.
But every investigation, canceled contract, and camera added to the DeFlock map makes the network more visible. Public awareness allows resistance. It also activates the psychological mechanism Foucault described.
You now know the grid exists.
Tomorrow you may notice it on your commute.
Power From the Bottom Up
The Panopticon explains what surveillance does. It does not fully explain who built this one.
Foucault rejected the idea that power is something the state simply owns and points downward like a weapon. Modern power, he argued, travels “capillary-wise.” It circulates through the smallest channels of ordinary life: schools, workplaces, hospitals, neighborhoods, and families.
People do not merely receive power.
They participate in it.
They classify each other. Report each other. Enforce norms. Collect records. Modern power makes authority less visible while making the population more visible.
Now return to Flock’s sales model.
Congress did not fund the network. No president announced it. HOAs, shopping centres, cities, and private companies assembled it subscription by subscription. Residents purchased the cameras with their own dues and mounted them at the entrances to their own neighborhoods.
Then they connected them to police.
This is sometimes called surveillance deputization. Ordinary people become extensions of a policing apparatus without anyone formally deputizing them.
The boundary between public and private authority did not get smashed in a dramatic takeover. It dissolved while looking like a neighborhood-watch upgrade.
And disciplinary power does more than observe. It sorts.
Research in Virginia’s Hampton Roads region found Flock cameras disproportionately concentrated in and around Black neighborhoods. Other audit logs showed officers using racial slurs for Romani and Traveller communities as reasons for “Convoy” searches.
The camera may read every plate using the same software.
The network does not watch every community equally.
The Total Sensorium
Late in an interview, Langley described the metric he uses to judge Flock’s success:
“For every crime that occurs that doesn’t get solved, it means we didn’t have enough cameras. That’s, to me, the easiest rubric.”
Follow that logic to its conclusion.
Every unsolved crime is evidence of insufficient surveillance. The correct number of cameras is always more. The final camera can only be installed after the final crime has been solved.
The plate reader becomes an entry point.
Flock’s Raven product adds audio detection. The company markets it for identifying gunshots, but the system can also flag voices, fireworks, and racing vehicles. The gaze develops ears.
Flock moved into “Drone as First Responder” technology after acquiring Aerodome and developing its Alpha drone. The gaze takes flight.
Then there is Nova.
Internal documents reported by 404 Media describe a product combining license-plate data with public records, property information, commercial data, and data-breach material. The stated capability is blunt: police can “jump from LPR to person.”
The system stops tracking vehicles and starts assembling people.
Foucault called this relationship power-knowledge. Systems of power create knowledge about a person, and every new record expands what institutions can do to the person inside it.
The database does not passively record you. It produces an institutional version of you.
Suspect vehicle. Hot-list entry. Associate. Pattern. Risk.
Once the file exists, the next question is how it will be used.
The audit log supplied the answer:
“Had an abortion, search for female.”
Watching the Watchers
June 2026. Dayton, Ohio.
City workers approached surveillance cameras their own city paid for and covered them with trash bags.
Officials had discovered that Dayton’s Flock data was searched thousands of times for immigration enforcement, contrary to city policy. The cameras remained under contract. While the legal questions moved through the system, the city physically blinded its own panopticon.
Foucault wrote that where there is power, there is resistance.
Cities have canceled contracts. Privacy commissions have rejected deployments. Legislators have proposed warrant requirements, sharing restrictions, and limits on data retention. Some people have mapped cameras, blocked their infrared systems, covered their lenses, or cut the poles down.
Software engineer Will Freeman created DeFlock, a crowdsourced public map containing more than 100,000 plate-reader locations.
It is tempting to say the map defeats the Panopticon by making the cameras visible. Bentham’s inmates could already see the tower. Visibility was how the tower disciplined them.
DeFlock reverses the direction of observation.
Researchers call this sousveillance: watching from below. Map the cameras. Request the logs. Publish the contracts. Place the people inside the tower under observation.
The watchers become watchable.
But the map has a double edge. Every new pin helps people avoid or challenge the network. Every pin also reminds them the network exists. Resistance and discipline expand together.
Langley initially described opposition to Flock as coordinated attacks from groups seeking to weaken public safety. He called DeFlock a “terroristic organization” driven by chaos. After a bipartisan backlash, he apologized and acknowledged that critics had valid concerns.
Asked about websites mapping his cameras, he said: “Assuming no one is committing a crime, it’s perfectly fine.”
Read that again.
If you have done nothing wrong, being watched is no problem. For years, that was the argument for pointing Flock cameras at everyone else. When the gaze turned toward the company, accepting the same principle required a national backlash.
Whether the apology marks a change of heart or a change in public-relations strategy remains an open question.
The audit logs will answer it.
The Camera We Bought
One of the largest surveillance networks in American history was never imposed through a single law.
No vote. No decree. No dramatic expansion of federal power.
We bought it.
With HOA dues. With private security budgets. With city-council line items most people never read. We installed it on our streets, pointed it at our neighbors, and gave police access because a company promised evidence, safety, and solved crimes.
Garrett Langley did not force every town to join. He built a product, and institutions across the country lined up to deputize themselves.
That is the uncomfortable part.
The system wanted this more than he did.
Foucault’s warning was never limited to an authoritarian ruler staring down from a tower. Modern power rarely arrives wearing a crown. It travels through ordinary institutions and willing participants. It presents itself as administration. Efficiency. Care.
Or a subscription service costing $2,500 a year.
The cancellations prove the network can be dismantled. Dayton bagged its cameras. Other cities walked away. But hundreds of new municipalities continued signing contracts while the revolt grew.
Resistance and surveillance are racing across the same map.
Which side does your town land on?
You can check now. The map exists.
And remember how all of this began. One camera. An Android phone inside a waterproof box. A frustrated engineer trying to catch whoever stole a gun from an unlocked car.
The thief took the gun.
What has been taken since is a lot harder to recover.
References
Bentham, J. (1791). Panopticon; or, The Inspection-House.
Foucault, M. (1975). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.
Foucault, M. (1976). Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France.
Flock Safety. Trust and Transparency materials and product documentation.
MuckRock. Flock Safety contracts, shared-network records, and agency audit logs.
Electronic Frontier Foundation. Flock Safety public-record investigations and ALPR litigation.
American Civil Liberties Union. Get the Flock Out campaign and Flock Safety research.
404 Media. Reporting on Flock network access, federal searches, camera security, and Nova.
Forbes. Reporting and interviews concerning Flock Safety, Garrett Langley, company growth, and opposition to the network.
Cheeky Pint. “Garrett Langley of Flock Safety” interview transcript.
DeFlock. Crowdsourced automated license-plate-reader map.
